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Abstract: Platform power is a societal concern on many levels. Thus, we argue that addressing it 
with the common market competition approach is limited. The research we present aims to 
develop and test an alternative approach to conceptualising and assessing platform power. We 
propose a framework that operationalises the concept of the integrated platform ecosystem by 
bounding it with theories of harm to citizen wellbeing. Applying it, instead of defining a market, we 
use a specific, novel theory of harm to define the audiovisual advertising ecosystem. Our 
investigation into the dynamics of this ecosystem and conditions shaping them incorporated elite 
interviews with representatives of firms involved, document analysis and an examination of legal 
frameworks in a sample of four European jurisdictions. The evidence we present points to an 
inherent bias in the opacity of trading and to systemic advantage in relationship building, as well 
as potential power imbalances at ‘nodes’ where data is used for targeting, planning, and metrics. 





Platform power is a central concern in the internet age. As a result we have seen 
some high profile anti-trust investigations in Europe and the US. 1 There have 
been many calls to address the dominant position of large platforms by using 
competition policy more vehemently and creatively than in the past (e.g., Crémer 
et al., 2019; Furman et al., 2019; Warren, 2019; Wu, 2018), and competition tools 
would seem the obvious choice for concerns about dominance of commercial ac-
tors. However, there is increasing evidence that the dominance of certain global 
platforms has much wider economic, societal and political implications than those 
usually addressed by interventions to promote competition (Moore & Tambini, 
2018). 
We have seen an exciting turn in both scholarship and policy discussions, as de-
bates have opened up about new ex-anti competition interventions. These include 
mandating data sharing or data openness and encouraging data portability (e.g. 
Furman et al., 2019; Stigler Center, 2019). Coyle (2018b) has suggested expanding 
the definition of consumer welfare within competition regulation to include con-
sideration of innovation in adjacent markets and related effects on societal welfare 
from the loss of potential innovation. Intervention has been proposed to address 
monopsony-related impacts on labour markets where platform companies are ma-
jor employers leaving workers few alternatives (Caves & Singer, 2018). There is al-
so evidence that regulators are increasingly thinking about privacy protections and 
service quality (Just, 2018). Traditional ways of assessing market power through 
market share, or ability to affect prices, seem inadequate in the face of these wider 
welfare concerns. If not defined by a market, how then can we identify problematic 
platform power and thereby appropriate regulatory intervention? In this article we 
aim to answer this both conceptual and practical question by developing and test-
ing an alternative approach to conceptualising and assessing platform power. 
Van Dijck, Nieborg and Poell (2019) advance two important conceptual steps. They 
argue for replacing the consumer welfare concept with one of citizen wellbeing 
that covers wider societal influence as well as the impact on individuals in the va-
riety of roles they play. The authors then propose looking at integrated platform 
ecosystems to examine “how platforms are behaving in relation to each other, 
1. The European Commission’s Directorate General for Competition has fined both Facebook and 
Google following recent investigations (see European Commission 2017a, 2017b & 2019) and in 
autumn 2019 US State Attorney Generals formally launched antitrust investigations into Facebook 
and Google’s parent company Alphabet (see Paxton, 2019; James, 2019), followed shortly after by 
the US Department of Justice. 
2 Internet Policy Review 9(4) | 2020
across markets, and across societal sectors” (van Dijck et al., 2019, p. 8). Given the 
ubiquity and interconnectedness of platforms, this may seem like it would open a 
pandora’s box that could not possibly be assessed by any regulator. Yet, van Dijck 
and colleagues call for investigation into specific case studies to reveal how power 
operates. We argue that such a specific case study can be delineated by defining a 
clear theory of harm to establish scope similarly to the way market definition en-
ables the assessment of market power. We demonstrate here a new framework for 
assessing platform power that defines a specific integrated platform ecosystem 
case using a theory of harm to citizen wellbeing and share the findings of our 
study of the dynamics within that case. 
The specific case from which we present results is that of the integrated platform 
ecosystem for video advertising. The case is delineated by a theory of harm to so-
ciety and citizens from the loss of mass media, much of which is dependent or par-
tially dependent on advertising. It focuses on video advertising, which accounts for 
over a third of all online display advertising in Europe (IAB Europe, 2019). The 
trade in video advertising brings platforms directly into competition with the au-
diovisual media services upon which societies depend for the production of news 
and culturally relevant content. The findings presented here are based on an in-
vestigation into the dynamics of relationships and decision-making in this ecosys-
tem through elite interviews, a review of reports and other publications from plat-
form owning companies, trade associations, public bodies, and scholars, and an ex-
amination of the legal frameworks in four jurisdictions: Belgium, France, Italy and 
the UK. 
The first contribution of this article is to establish a new theory of harm for use in 
the policy debates around platforms that merges competition concerns with those 
associated with media pluralism and the role of media in society. The second is to 
introduce a new framework for assessing platform power that draws out the rela-
tionships, decision-making and dynamics within an integrated platform ecosystem 
revealing specific sources and locations, or nodes, of power. The kinds of power we 
identify are not market power, but instead are infrastructural and strategic, and 
provide a potential source of dominance. Thirdly, we consider the policy implica-
tions of the findings generated by the application of our framework, and outline 
specific information they indicate should be made transparent or made available 
to regulators responsible for dealing with problematic abuse of dominance in this 
case. 
The next section traces the evolution of the conceptualisation of consumer welfare 
to include wider wellbeing concerns. Section three presents a theory of harm 
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linked to mass media’s role in citizen wellbeing. After a brief account of the 
methodology in section four, section five presents the integrated platform ecosys-
tem for video advertising and findings from the examination of the relationship 
dynamics within it. Section six identifies where power is accumulated in the func-
tion of data in three nodes within the ecosystem. In the final section, we suggest 
how the findings can be used to inform policy making and argue that the examina-
tion of integrated platform ecosystems bounded by other theories of harm is nec-
essary to ensure holistic approaches to potential platform dominance. 
From welfare in markets to wellbeing in ecosystems 
The expansion of online platforms has inspired scholars to re-examine some of the 
core concepts for assessing competition and dominance, yet operationalisable con-
ceptualisations and frameworks that can accommodate the range of concerns are 
still lacking. Online platforms pose challenges for traditional competition policy 
because it is hard to define the markets in which they operate and what consti-
tutes market power. Competition economists describe platforms in general using a 
two-sided model where there are indirect network effects of one side on the other, 
with zero or low costs for one side (Lerner, 2014; Rochet & Tirole, 2006; Rochet & 
Tirole, 2003). Evans and Schmalensee (Evans, 2003; Evans & Schmalensee, 2013) 
argue that many platforms, including those that deal in advertising such as Google 
and Facebook, should be thought of as multi-sided because they are trading with a 
number of different groups, namely users, advertisers, content providers, app de-
velopers, and even third party data brokers. They and others (Coyle, 2018a, 2018b; 
Wismer & Rasek, 2017) contend that because the welfare of these different “cus-
tomers” on the different sides are intricately intertwined and subject to feedback 
effects, the standard competition tools for assessing market definition and market 
power are limited. 
It is precisely these types of intertwined welfare benefits that have enabled the 
commercial media to fulfil a public interest role. Media supplies content to audi-
ences for free or at low cost subsidised by the sale of their attention to advertisers. 
Their intertwined welfare relationships are characterised by the number of viewers 
and prices for advertisers and the nuisance factor of advertising for viewers (An-
derson & Jullien, 2015). This is not new. On one side, the determination of price 
for advertisers is a complex process involving choice of media, audience numbers, 
and discretionary factors such as volume discounts, rebates based on duration of 
commitment, and agency commissions. On the other side are a range of public in-
terest and individual rights concerns related to citizens’ use of media that cannot 
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be measured by price or substitution. The notion that individuals are both citizens 
and consumers has been central to media regulation for some time (Lunt & Living-
stone, 2011), which is why media company mergers in Europe have been subject to 
special conditions related to media pluralism for decades. Media regulation is 
characterised by ex-anti interventions, obligations on the state, self- and co-regu-
latory mechanisms, and qualitative assessments of plurality and diversity. 
The need to address online platforms has inspired new thinking about consumer 
welfare that moves in the direction of considering fundamental rights and con-
sumers as part of a society. A wider discussion is taking place about platform dom-
inance. Questions are commonly raised about the power that platforms have over 
citizens, such as, for example, in establishing new speech norms (Wagner, 2018), 
setting agendas (Schlosberg, 2018), political debate and democratic processes 
(Moore, 2018). In these we can see a concern for dominance through the dissemi-
nation of symbolic forms (Thompson, 2013) and the power to affect desires and 
decision-making (Lukes, 2005). These are both forms of power associated with me-
dia and the policy objective of media pluralism. The special treatment of media 
pluralism under competition policy acknowledges the need for citizens to be pro-
tected from undue concentrations of these forms of power, but the recognition of 
this has not yet inspired a reconceptualisation of power in other areas. 
We point to two new directions with potential for accommodating concern for indi-
viduals as citizen within society. Firstly, competition scholars have been revising 
ideas about market power and consumer choice. Bamberger and Lobel (2018) point 
out that due to the nature of platforms, market power can restrict consumer choice 
in relation to their personal privacy. Competition authorities have also been ex-
panding their considerations to non-price factors including user privacy and quali-
ty (Just, 2018). For content delivery platforms non-price factors can involve subjec-
tive characteristics such as the level and nature of child protection measures or 
the rigour of their moderation of user generated content for hate speech or incite-
ment. Another concern is how the behaviour of certain platforms affects innova-
tion in technology and services and whether it may stifle it to the detriment of so-
ciety. Coyle (2018b, p. 17) points out that there can be consequences even in adja-
cent markets where potential innovators face issues affecting their choices and 
their incentives to invest and innovate, and argues that regulators “should aban-
don conventional market definition in favour of a wider view of the ecosystem of 
markets centred around a platform”. The assumption here is that consumers might 
be negatively affected in a variety of ways by loss of investment or innovation. 
The second direction addresses the problem that defining power in terms of mar-
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ket share or economic strength in relation to competitors 2 does not account for 
power in relation to complementors or connected to the intermediary function of 
platforms. Strategic management and information systems scholarship have long 
regarded platforms as operating within ecosystems and exercising power or con-
trol over those participating in them. According to Jacobides, Cennamo and Gawer 
(2018, p. 2264), an ecosystem is “a set of actors with varying degrees of multilater-
al, non-generic complementarities that are not fully hierarchically controlled”. 
They argue key questions should be asked as to the extent to which an online 
platform company wields power within an ecosystem over decision-making, such 
as on price or supply, and the extent to which investments made by complemen-
tors, such as app creators or product sellers on a marketplace platforms, are fungi-
ble (see also Boudreau & Hagiu, 2009). 
Online platform owners orchestrate asymmetric relationships with both consumer 
users and complementors within their ecosystems (Tiwana, 2014). They use a vari-
ety of mechanisms to govern their ecosystems such as controlling access to bound-
ary resources including data, control of processes, setting levels of openness and 
the technical design (Schreieck et al., 2016). Seeming to echo Castells’ (2011, 
2013) earlier accounts of network power, Kenney and colleagues (2019) argue, “the 
power of platforms lies in how they can orchestrate the activities of participants, 
and largely determine the operation of the far more numerous complementors in 
the ecosystem”. They identify two aspects of this power: the artifactual derived 
from the software and algorithms, and the contractual from their ability to set the 
terms and conditions for all users. This literature has done much to identify ways 
platform owners can exercise power over their transactional relationships with 
other businesses, and there has been a recent recognition that consideration of 
competitive dynamics requires a “shift in empirical focus from within-ecosystem to 
across-ecosystem dynamics” (Jacobides et al., 2018, p. 2268). 
There has therefore been both the expansion of the concept of consumer welfare 
and a recognition that platform power can amount to dominance not only in rela-
tion to direct competitors, but also in how they interact across ecosystems. The 
challenge remains operationalising these in a framework that can be used in the 
manner that market power and consumer welfare have been. Schweitzer, Kerber 
and colleagues (Kerber, 2019; Schweitzer et al., 2018) propose the concept of in-
termediation power and argue it should be recognised as a form of market power. 
2. Under European Union competition law for example dominance is defined as a position of “eco-
nomic strength” that afford “the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its 
competitors, its customers and ultimately of its consumers” (United Brands Company and United 
Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of the European Communities., 1978). 
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Using this concept, they maintain, dominance could be assessed in relation to the 
importance of the platform to business users for reaching certain user or customer 
groups and on information asymmetries. More radically, Lynsky (2017) has argued 
for replacing the assessment of market power with a focus on the gatekeeper func-
tion inherent in the role of platforms as intermediaries. Drawing on the earlier 
work by Barzilai-Nahon on network gatekeeping and Laidlaw’s adaptation into in-
ternet information gatekeepers, Lynksy maintains that the concept of gatekeeper 
will give a much better account of online power, and that it is as much about me-
diating access to individuals as it is about access to information. The focus on 
gatekeeping has potential for marrying societal interest in having a diversity of 
providers with individual citizens’ need for choice in order to effectively exercise 
their fundamental rights. However, designing regulatory intervention also requires 
practical ways of identifying where intermediation or gatekeeping are taking place 
and assessing whether they are problematic in specific instances. 
Making their case for using the concept of citizen wellbeing instead of consumer 
welfare, van Dijck et al. (2019) echo arguments made about media regulation 
decades ago (see Livingstone & Lunt, 2007). They argue that using the term citi-
zen acknowledges democratic and civic duties and allows for consideration of the 
individual as part of a collective or public. Using wellbeing instead of welfare, they 
contend, incorporates long-term consequences and the variety of simultaneous 
roles citizens may play in society that one cannot “bracket off” from each other 
(van Dijck et al., 2019, p. 6). Their concept of an integrated platform ecosystem cap-
tures how platforms interact with each other and across multiple markets and so-
cietal sectors, offering a new way to “see how some platforms accrue unfair advan-
tage” (2019, p. 8). Scholarship has arrived at new concepts for considering the po-
sitions of platforms, but given the pervasiveness of platforms and the breadth of 
wellbeing concerns involved, an additional step is still needed for these concepts 
to be useful in identifying sources of power or situations of dominance. This re-
quires frameworks that can be applied to specific cases for empirical study or reg-
ulatory assessment. We therefore put forth such a framework using these two con-
cepts. 
A theory of harm to citizen wellbeing 
We propose a new theory of harm to citizen wellbeing, which we use to define a 
specific integrated platform ecosystem case. Theories of harm that describe the 
anti-competitive behaviour (e.g., abuse of dominance, collusion, foreclosure) and 
necessitate the demonstration of harm to consumers have been the basis for com-
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petition enforcement in Europe for some time (Zenger & Walker, 2012). In line 
with the expanding ideas about consumer welfare described above, there have 
been recent advances in these theories. These nevertheless are limited by contin-
ued focus on the connection between the conditions for competitors and prices or 
consumer choice. Even the novel theory of harm rooted in consumer rights to pri-
vacy (Abate, 2018) and the emerging theory of harm to innovation (Petit, 2017) ap-
pear concerned about the behaviour of competitors and choice for individual con-
sumers. These theories are not used to determine which firms might be included in 
a competition investigation. Market definition, which in the EU context relies on 
substitutability and geographic reach (European Commission, 1997), is still the 
tool used to establish the scope of any given case. 3 
A theory of harm to citizen wellbeing instead points us towards the institutions re-
quired to exercise civic duties and maintain the collective society, and therefore 
can delineate an integrated platform ecosystem case. Here we advance a theory of 
harm to citizens, as individuals and as collective publics, from the loss of mass au-
diovisual media due to competition from online content delivery platforms. The 
key concern is the potential that platform dominance on the playing field for ad-
vertising is detrimental to the advertising-supported audiovisual media. 
There is ample evidence that the thriving online content delivery platforms have 
become crucial locations for individual expression, disseminating information and 
political organising, especially for minorities and vulnerable groups, but not neces-
sarily a shared experience or public sphere (Papacharissi, 2010). They can also be 
used to spread misogyny, racism and xenophobia, with women and people from 
minority backgrounds sometimes silenced by threats and abuse. Audiovisual media 
services, which in Europe include many public service broadcasters, are still the 
biggest investors in content, attract mass audiences, and in most jurisdictions re-
main heavily regulated. Concerns have been raised about the impact of these de-
clining revenues on the production of journalism (Australian Competition and Con-
sumer Commission, 2018; Bell, 2018; Cairncross, 2019). Journalism is widely ac-
knowledged to be important for the exercise of democracy in multiple ways, but 
the normative standpoint behind our theory of harm is not only concerned about 
journalism. 
Entertainment content, the mass consumed foundation of popular culture, is im-
portant for social cohesion and democracy (Street, 2010). Though it can serve to 
3. A good example of the problems with this approach in relation to platforms can be found in the 
Google Shopping case (see Broos & Marcos Ramos, 2017; Buttà, 2018). 
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perpetuate stereotypes and inequalities, mass entertainment content also provides 
space where societies can negotiate new norms, as exemplified by its role in main-
streaming diversity in gender identity and sexual orientation (Calzo & Ward, 2009; 
Bonds-Raacke 2007). A diversity of content is required for media to fulfil its role in 
enabling individuals’ expression rights and self-actualisation (Baker, 1989). Soci-
eties need a pluralism of institutional forms, owners, and political and cultural 
purposes in order to ensure citizens can exercise rights fundamental to their well-
being (Baker, 2006; Kenyon, 2014) both as individuals and as collectives. They 
need both platforms through which they can share their own content and engage 
with that of others, and a diversity of media companies with sufficient scale to in-
vest in quality mass-consumed professional content. 
The expansion of content sharing platforms such as Facebook and YouTube, and 
the growth of programmatic means for buying online inventory on websites has 
resulted in rapid growth in online advertising, especially online video (IAB Europe, 
2019; Zenith Media, 2019). In the meantime, revenues for audiovisual media ser-
vices (television) have been nearly stagnant and print media have suffered enor-
mously (Zenith Media, 2019, p. 9). Recent policy debates about how to achieve a 
more level playing field between online platforms and audiovisual media services 
were central to recent revisions to EU media laws (Broughton Micova, forthcom-
ing). One of the main steps taken was to even out qualitative rules related to ad-
vertising. Competition authorities have also been investigating online advertising 
and found problematic platform dominance (e.g., Australian Competition and Con-
sumer Commission, 2019; Competition & Markets Authority (CMA), 2020). There is, 
therefore, a well-established normative basis for this theory of harm to citizen 
wellbeing and some indications that harm may be occurring. 
Methodology 
The starting point for this investigation was the theory of harm to citizens and so-
ciety as a result of fewer resources going into the mass media. It was inspired by 
debates about the extent to which online platforms were competing with audiovi-
sual media services for advertising and claims that this competition was not fair. 
Though there was evidence of declining or stagnating revenues, we did not as-
sume these declines were a result of unfair advantage or platform dominance, but 
neither did we assume that firms selling online advertising inventory or carrying 
user generated content were operating in separately defined markets from audio-
visual media services. Instead, we set out to uncover the dynamics of what we ini-
tially termed a playing field delineated by our theory of harm. Our mapping of 
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players and relationships based on this theory of harm resulted in an ecosystem 
that included multiple online platforms and various actors, private and public 
firms, that engage in the supply of content to audiences/users and the trade in the 
video advertising that supports it. 
The ecosystem-based framework calls for nuanced understanding of the dynamics 
among the firms within this ecosystem and the conditions that shape them more 
than economic assessments of relative position and performance. We sought an-
swers to questions about how relationships among the firms were formed and 
maintained and how decisions were made in relation to the transactions among 
them. This required talking to those nurturing the relationships and making deci-
sions within the firms, which we did through semi-structured interviews. To under-
stand the conditions within which this was happening we conducted an analysis of 
regulatory frameworks and examined academic and trade publications, as well as 
documents produced by the firms involved, for evidence on business conditions 
and practices. 
Advertising still happens very much on national levels, so we needed to designate 
national jurisdictions to serve as a sample of the conditions within which actors 
were operating. We wanted to engage with actors in relatively developed markets 
where the main global players have a presence, 4 whilst ensuring some diversity of 
experience. We chose to approach individuals representing actors in Belgium, 
France, Italy and the UK to achieve a mix in the ratio of online to offline advertis-
ing expenditures and in the development of programmatic and other addressable 
advertising options. As EU member states, all four shared significant regulatory 
commonalities at that time. However, since the area of media is characterised by 
minimum harmonisation and devolved competencies, the four countries also of-
fered some variety in regulatory frameworks. Data available at the time showed 
that the UK, Italy and France were amongst the biggest TV advertising markets in 
the EU, but the UK far exceeded the others in the use of online, particularly pro-
grammatic, advertising (Grece, 2017). TV revenues were growing still only in Italy. 
Belgium was taken as a smaller market with its own intricacies due to the devolu-
tion of powers to its communities and the use of French, Flemish and German as 
national languages. In every country scrutinised, television advertising remained 
an important component of media planning, although to different degrees. Lon-
don, Paris and Milan were also all locations where individuals with regional re-
4. We considered including additionally a smaller country from South Eastern Europe where we also 
would have had linguistic competence, but there was limited in-country presence of major plat-
forms and the budgets of major advertisers were often set at a regional level. 
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sponsibilities were located, and several of those interviewed were not solely re-
sponsible for national markets. 
We conducted 26 ‘elite’ semi-structured interviews (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002; 
Harvey, 2011) with 36 respondents in total - from advertisers, media agencies, 
video sharing platforms, to audiovisual media services. These were mostly con-
ducted with senior persons included for their key role in the decision-making and 
their responsibility for relationships between actors, while three would qualify as 
‘expert’ interviews with individuals not directly involved in the trade (Van Auden-
hove & Donders, 2019). 5 A two layered thematic coding of interview transcripts 
was done using Nvivo. The first layer of coding was based on the interview re-
sponses about how budget expenditure and media buying decisions were made on 
the demand side, how supply side actors sold their inventory and set prices, how 
metrics or and data were used, and the nature of the relationships among the 
players. In the second layer of coding, themes identified in the first layer were 
mapped out in a spreadsheet, and the word frequency functions within Nvivo were 
used to help confirm salience and identify themes. 6 
The regulatory frameworks in the four countries were examined through a set of 
pre-determined variables, based on what the literature and interview data indicat-
ed shaped the conditions for the ecosystem. We looked at legislation, regulatory 
decisions, and self-regulatory instruments in the following areas: consumer protec-
tion (in relation to advertising), data protection, taxation (as applicable to the rele-
vant companies), competition and pluralism, advertising standards and content 
rules. A detailed presentation of the empirical work was published as a policy pa-
per (Broughton Micova & Jacques, 2019) intended for policy makers and stakehold-
ers, and covered issues of substitutability of ad inventory, data use, the evenness of 
rules and relationships among actors. Our interrogation of the data from the per-
spective of platform power forms the basis for the findings we present here. 
5. Sampling was purposive with individuals identified through industry contacts and by trawling 
through corporate web pages and LinkedIn profiles. Interviews were conducted between 1 August 
and 20 October 2018, mostly individual, but sometimes with responsible teams, hence the differ-
ence between the number of interviews and the number of interviewees. Though we were unable 
to get representatives from all the major global platforms to agree to participate, we did get a mix 
of three different firms with different profiles in terms of involvement in the ecosystem. Those in-
terviews with actors outside of the actual trade came from one regulatory authority, one commer-
cial insight firm, and one pan-European industry association. 
6. Sixty-eight sub-codes were identified across the first level themes. To be included a sub-theme had 
to be found in at least two transcripts. A full matrix is available from the authors. 
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The video advertising ecosystem 
In this section we explain the integrated platform ecosystem for audiovisual adver-
tising as understood through the application of our framework and built on our 
empirical data. The findings indicate that relationships beyond the direct exchange 
of money or data among actors, even personal connections between individuals, 
remain crucial, with a variety of resources required for the maintenance of those 
relationships. We found two systemic sources of strategic power: 
• Relationship advantage (stemming from transnational nature and large 
scale) 
• Opacity bias (stemming from lack of transparency in trading systems) 
Before elaborating these systemic conditions that seemed to contribute to accu-
mulation of strategic power, we first describe the actors involved in the ecosystem, 
illustrated in Figure 1 below, and the relationships among them. 
FIGURE 1: Integrated platform ecosystem for video advertising. Source: The authors, adapted and 
advanced from an earlier version in Broughton Micova & Jacques, 2019 p. 9 
Figure 1 shows a picture of complexity and interconnectedness. Separated into de-
mand side (grey) and supply side (green), it shows the main categories of actors. 
Our investigation affirms the elaboration of the flows of money and data among 
those involved in online advertising given by Adshead and colleagues (2019), but 
also reveals the importance of relationships that often do not involve the direct 
exchange of money or data, indicated here by the bright green lines. These can 
crucially shape the conditions of transactions and decisions regarding spending. 
12 Internet Policy Review 9(4) | 2020
On the right-hand side of Figure 1 are those that offer video advertising inventory. 
The audiovisual media services offer a variety of inventory on linear television and 
on their video on demand (AVOD) services, as well addressable options on TV and 
their websites that can be sold directly or through programmatic trading. Program-
matic trading, which is indicated by the bracketed area in Figure 1, is the trading 
of advertising through automated means using multiple data points. It can be 
through real time bidding (RTB) shown in the ‘auction’ diamond or by non-auction 
means that are still automated, which we have indicated by dark blue lines of ex-
change between reserve platforms (for a fuller explanation see IAB Europe, 2014). 
The platforms for user-generated content (UGC) such as YouTube (Google) and 
Facebook sell programmatically through both RTB and reserve systems, in which 
premium inventory is sold through non-auction marketplaces. Press publishers and 
countless websites also offer video advertising, a lot of which is traded program-
matically through RTB, with only the larger ones having premium buy or other di-
rect sales options. 
On the left side of Figure 1 are the demand side actors, or those that hold the ad-
vertising budgets and are buying advertising inventory divided between large 
companies that operate across multiple national markets and ones that operate 
mainly within a national market. A consistent message from those interviewed was 
that most decision-making about campaign strategy and planning was still largely 
done within national markets. However, a growing trend towards internationalisa-
tion was reported to exist among the large multi-national advertisers, coupled 
with an increasing focus on short-term performance driven by elevated roles for 
procurement and finance within the advertisers. Those on the supply side that op-
erate transnationally and can build the kind of non-transaction relationships 
shown by the bright green lines in Figure 1 with advertiser headquarters seemed 
to have an advantage over those that do not. 
Relationship advantage: building ties and faith in the channel 
Platform and audiovisual media services (AVMS) respondents reported spending 
vast amounts of time and resources on “client support”, developing trust and per-
sonal relationships as well as educating agencies and advertisers about their tools 
and the value of their inventory. Larger businesses with greater resources to invest 
in this kind of relationship building would have an advantage. One platform re-
spondent described, “at least the first couple years were just on educating, and 
there were small teams within all agencies that taught about programmatic and 
how to bring programmatic products to agencies”. In contrast, a respondent from a 
national level AVMS reported his company had a team of two people traveling 
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around to advertisers explaining what could be done with the addressable TV that 
they were rolling out. 
In addition, at a global level, large advertisers have, as one respondent described, 
“deep direct relationships” with all the major inventory holding platforms as well 
as ad tech suppliers and demand side platforms (DSPs) through which buying 
takes place. One respondent from a major advertiser explained that these allow 
them to deal with issues such as brand safety and environment quality. Another 
put it in terms of establishing “global principles and best practices” for working 
with them. It was mentioned that large platforms had made great improvements 
on brand safety tools, and there are third party verifying tools. One respondent 
from a global portfolio brand claimed that threats from advertisers to pull their 
campaigns had led to some of the brand safety improvements on major platforms 
such as YouTube, but when asked if that meant they were in a position of strength, 
he responded: “I don't think anybody is in a position of strength against 
Google…because they are so dominant and very, very smart". 
The inventory offered by AVMS was already trusted in terms of brand safety and 
environment, but AVMS respondents consistently reported having to convince 
agency and advertiser contacts of the effectiveness of their inventory. They also re-
ported working through their transnational associations or in smaller collabora-
tions to reassure advertisers of the effectiveness of their inventory. This included 
investing in their own programmatic tools for trading across services and even 
transnationally in order to meet advertisers needs for addressability (e.g., Dziadul, 
2019; EBX, 2017). Nevertheless, they appeared at a disadvantage not only because 
of differences in the resources available for investment but also in the accessibility 
of the data required for telling the story of success, which will be discussed further 
in the section below. AVMSs appeared to be vying not just market power, but in-
stead, we argue, a form of strategic power that seems to stem not just from the 
size of a platform’s user base or audience but also from its capacity to invest in 
personal relationships and building faith in its inventory and tools, as well as the 
transnational level at which some relationships operated. 
Opacity bias: lack of transparency enhancing power 
The direct close relationships the inventory holders have with advertisers shape 
the preferences and perceptions of effectiveness that feed into the negotiations 
that agencies have in the buying process. It was confirmed by respondents of all 
categories that the rebates, discounts and kickbacks for which the arbitrage system 
of media buying has been known are still prevalent, despite the growth of pro-
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grammatic trading. Numerous respondents from demand and supply sides cited 
the lack of transparency in the exchanges involved the buying of addressable in-
ventory, especially through programmatic trading, as a source of concern and even 
mistrust. 
The volume discounts or rebates negotiated between agencies and AVMSs were 
reported to be somewhat transparent in the countries studied because of the au-
dited and accessible audience measurement and regulation requiring financial re-
porting. However, this was not the case in relation to platforms and online inven-
tory. As has been noted also in other reports (Adshead et al., 2019; Select Commit-
tee on Communications, 2018; Stigler Center, 2019) there is a severe lack of trans-
parency in the dealings that occur in the middle of Figure 1 where programmatic 
trading and premium buys of online inventory takes place. Multiple agency re-
spondents acknowledged they often get high margins on this kind of trading. 
Some attributed a preference for it to the erosion of agency commissions and pres-
sures to reduce fees. 
The financial exchanges were not the only issue. In premium and reserve buying 
other conditions such as placement, brand safety protection and other qualitative 
considerations were mentioned as important parts of deals. Complex tools and 
specific expertise are required to navigate the online buying environment. Things 
change frequently and the evidence from respondents representing demand side 
actors indicated that media agencies have positioned themselves as able to keep 
up with the dynamic and complex online buying environment. According to multi-
ple agency respondents, they were not able to control all the conditions, such as 
what viewability and duration will count as a chargeable view, but they invested a 
great deal in expertise to get the most out of buying online inventory. Their ac-
counts attested to the ability of platforms to set the terms of trade for complemen-
tors (Kenney et al., 2019; Schreieck et al., 2016). The accounts also indicate that 
the capacity to navigate the technology created by platforms were of strategic val-
ue to the agencies. 
Examining the integrated platform ecosystem shows that there is also power in 
being able to work effectively across those individual ecosystems. There is not one 
firm responsible for the lack of financial, and contractual, transparency in the trad-
ing of online inventory but it does appear to be a source of strategic power, for 
media agencies as well as online platform owners. The implications of this opacity 
are not only that national and local media be harmed if agencies are incentivised 
to push programmatic online options to clients, but also citizen wellbeing can be 
diminished in other ways given the evidence of discrimination, gender stereotyp-
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ing and other negative aspects of targeted online advertising (Boi et al., 2020; An-
dreou et al., 2019; Speicher et al., 2018). 
Systemic sources of strategic power 
The evidence above indicates that firms with larger capital resources operating 
transnationally and those whose inventory allows media agencies to extract larger 
margins due to the lack of transparency in trades, have greater strategic power in 
the ecosystem. The one exception among the cases was in France, where the Sapin 
Law - in place since 1993 - ensured that financial details such as actual cost, dis-
counts and agency margins were shared with agencies. Amendments in 2015 and 
2017 extended its reach to online advertising giving advertisers access to details 
on bid and traded prices as well as qualitative conditions for programmatically 
traded inventory. This fills to some extent the informational gaps, allowing adver-
tisers to understand the true costs of various inventory and removing some of the 
incentives for media agencies to choose programmatically traded inventory. It 
does not reduce the need for specialist expertise through which agencies derive 
some power. 
The provision of the data to advertisers as mandated by the Sapin Law also does 
not equate to the same level of transparency in the whole system afforded by the 
combination of independent and audited audience metrics and regular financial 
reporting characteristic of AVMSs. The consequence is that not all those working 
to build relationships with advertisers and faith in their inventory are able to de-
velop the same insight into their competition and assess the relative value of their 
offer. This problem is exacerbated by the way data functions and flows in the 
ecosystem. 
Power at nodes of data use 
Data flows along many of the lines illustrated in Figure 1 above, but these flows 
are characterised by vast differences in the ability to generate and access data as 
well as lock-in effects. Personal data enables the targeting of individuals and 
households. It comes together from a variety of sources in media agencies and 
most crucially in the platforms used to “activate” campaigns online. Van Dijck et al. 
(2019), suggest looking for nodes of infrastructural power within an integrated 
platform ecosystem. 
We identified three nodes of data use within the ecosystem where there appear to 
be imbalances in infrastructural and strategic power: 
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• Targeting node (where ads are served to individuals) 
• Planning node (where potential effectiveness is determined) 
• Metrics node (where past efficiency is demonstrated) 
At the targeting node personal identifiable data functions in the delivery of online 
ads to specific users based on targeting criteria. At the planning and metrics 
nodes, personal data that has been pseudonymised or possibly anonymised such 
that it could be considered non-personal (Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 
2014), and non-personal data generated by financial transactions enable decision 
making. 
Targeting node: walled gardens of personal data 
Eight different respondents used the term “walled gardens” to describe where data 
flows are contained and controlled by individual companies, sometimes owning 
multiple platforms at different places in the ecosystem. One interviewee described 
the problem with walled gardens as being that they bind them into using a partic-
ular platform for placing ads even across a variety of inventory holders. As was ex-
plained by interviewees from platforms, containing personal data within their indi-
vidual platform ecosystem is necessary to comply with data protection rules, which 
they saw not just as a legal obligation but also as duty to their users. Maintaining 
walled gardens may be completely justifiable on data protection grounds. Never-
theless, this point where the personal data used in targeting is linked to specific 
individuals being served ads seems to be a crucial node where power is accumu-
lated in the ecosystem. 
Here, the distinction made by van Dijck et al. (2018) between infrastructural and 
sectoral platforms is useful. Those platforms in the ecosystem that connect the ad 
to the individual, using his or her personal data, could be considered infrastructur-
al in the same way as telecommunications networks (digital terrestrial television, 
cable, internet protocol television, satellite) used to deliver ads to audiences in 
television channels. The online platforms delivering the content in which the ads 
are placed, such as YouTube or Facebook, can be considered sectoral platforms, 
parallel to the audiovisual media services whose channels provide the vehicle for 
the ads served to television audiences. 
Some walled gardens are bigger than others and many sectoral platform owners 
also own infrastructural ones. The evidence from the interviews indicates that 
there is an imbalance in infrastructural power with some infrastructural platforms, 
namely those owned by Alphabet/Google, overwhelmingly most used because of 
the amount of personal data in their garden (for an ownership analysis of adserv-
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ing see Geradin & Katsifis, 2019). For example, in the accounts from agency re-
spondents it appeared that it was not that YouTube as a medium was unavoidable, 
but that the Google-owned tools for buying online inventory were. Google and 
Facebook were not the only actors holding some of that kind of power, however. 
Media agencies played a pivotal role in the accumulation and utilisation of person-
al data, including from third party providers and from their clients - and some also 
owned platforms engaged in the node described above. Audiovisual media services 
were emulating the “walled gardens” model for their addressable options. One in-
terviewee stated that data ownership was a key issue in their agreement with the 
network operator in their roll out of addressable TV, 7 whereas in another jurisdic-
tion this was regulated by law. 
Planning & metrics nodes: functions of aggregate and 
anonymised data 
We found a different kind of power at play in the planning node, where decisions 
were made by those controlling advertising budgets. Here strategic power seemed 
to stem from the ability to pool and use data generated by users’ behaviour and 
past campaigns in aggregate form, that is akin to the panel surveys and audience 
measurement data that have long been used in advertising. Multiple agency re-
spondents described using complex econometric models in campaign design, as “a 
directional tool”. Historical data linked to past campaigns and generated by user 
behaviour also feeds into attribution models and other means for demonstrating 
the efficacy of various inventory options in achieving certain objectives. The cost 
of inventory also figures into both designing campaigns and in demonstrating suc-
cess. 
A crucial source of advantage was evident in the ability to join up data from past 
financial transactions with the aggregate user or audience data. Here, media agen-
cies seem to have the most access to input data and the capacity to process it. 
Several media agency respondents explained that they consider video as a whole 
now rather offline and online separately, but that this required effort and expertise 
due to the lack of standardisation of metrics. The lack of a “common video curren-
cy”, which was mentioned by many respondents from various actors in the ecosys-
tem, and the “walled gardens” made it difficult for the agencies to, as one respon-
dent put it, “join up” across inventory holders even though this kind of data could 
be sufficiently anonymised as to no longer be personal. 
7. Addressable TV refers to a way of delivering targeted advertising to households during linear TV 
broadcasting. 
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It was in the metrics node of demonstrating efficacy and efficiency that the aggre-
gate data generated by people’s behaviour online appeared to function in the 
same way as the much more accessible and independently audited audience mea-
surement data used for television. Some firms were better represented in these 
metrics and had the ability to shape them. Here, the scale of an actor’s strategic 
power therefore can be determined by the extent to which they have access to the 
necessary aggregate data and/or the ability to set the terms upon which success is 
determined. This aggregate data could be considered essential for competition 
among advertising dependent media. If, as set out in the theory of harm elaborat-
ed above, a plurality of independent media is important to citizen wellbeing, then 
ensuring access to and auditing of metrics is essential to a healthy ecosystem and 
defendable on public interest grounds. 
Collecting information at nodes of power 
Numerous options are on the table for dealing with the perceived dominance of 
certain platforms, including breaking up companies, mandating data sharing or 
openness, sector specific regulation, and other structural remedies. As Rahman has 
pointed out, in considering any kind of structural regulation of platforms, “the con-
ceptual challenge we face now is precisely over the question of what kinds of in-
formation to collect, control, and pursue” (2018, p. 250). We found that a distinct 
value of examining an integrated platform ecosystem bound by a specific theory of 
harm, is that the identification of types and nodes of power can indicate what in-
formation is necessary to inform regulatory intervention. The evidence from this 
investigation indicated that infrastructural and strategic power is concentrated in 
online platform owners, especially the ones owning multiple platforms within the 
ecosystem. However, it also showed that in some nodes other actors also have 
power. Media agencies hold power in the generation of insight from data for pre-
dicting the potential efficacy of inventory. AVMSs, may be gaining power in the in-
frastructural targeting node where aggregate insight is joined with personal data 
for targeting. What information must be collected or pursued in order to determine 
when intervention is needed and of what kind? 
TABLE 1: Three nodes of power stemming from the function of data and the related information 
NODE INFORMATION 
Targeting node: where insight is joined 
with personal data for serving ads 
The number of platforms engaged in 
exactly this node, who owns them and 
Source: the authors 
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NODE INFORMATION 
(infrastructural) 
their share of the trade;The extent to 
which the software and channels 
required are proprietary or open;The 
extent to which media buyers and 
advertisers have a choice among ways 
to serve advertising or inventory 
holders have a choice through which to 
supply;The extent to which media 
buyers and advertisers on one side and 
inventory holders on the other side are 
able to influence the conditions of the 
contracts with the platforms active in 
this node. 
Planning node: where aggregate data 
from multiple sources is used to 
determine how effective various 
inventory are likely to be to reach an 
objective (strategic) 
The point at which personal data from 
people’s behaviour online or 
volunteered by them become non-
personal – the level and location of 
anonymisation and aggregation;The 
number of different actors engaged in 
this node, who owns them, and their 
share of trade;The extent to which the 
actors selling inventory are 
represented in the data used and the 
extent to which they have a view to 
how they are represented. 
Metrics node: where aggregate data is 
used to generate metrics for 
demonstrating effectiveness and 
efficiency (strategic) 
The point at which personal data from 
people’s behaviour online or 
volunteered by them become non-
personal – the level and location of 
anonymisation and aggregation;The 
sources of the data required to 
generate the metrics used and who has 
access to that data;The way the metrics 
have been defined and the actors that 
have been involved in doing it; The 
extent to which the metrics are 
transparent or accessible to all actors. 
Source: the authors 
Some of the types of information listed in Table 1 are ones that are typical of com-
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petition market studies such as the share of trade of each actor or the extent to 
which there is a choice of firms to use. The information we suggest be gathered in 
relation to the targeting node should contribute to an evaluation of any gatekeep-
ing (Lynskey, 2017). It can help to establish whether the gatekeeping amounts to a 
problematic form of dominance and the extent to which it is necessitated by data 
protection law or a result of certain platforms’ artifactual and contractual gover-
nance of others in their ecosystems (Kenney et al., 2019). A key step noted for the 
planning and metrics nodes is the assessment of where and how the personal data 
gathered by the various actors in the ecosystem no longer needs to be personal, or 
when it is aggregated and anonymised to an extent that no longer requires protec-
tion. This step seems a necessary precursor to any intervention aimed at pro-com-
petition regulation related to data sharing or openness. This may involve data 
from platforms, AVMSs with addressable options, network providers, device mak-
ers, and various third-party data providers and trackers. The types of information 
required to uncover potential dominance or undue power in the metrics node are 
directly related to the participation in the integrated ecosystem of platforms that 
exercise control over standards within their individual ecosystems (Schreieck et al., 
2016). This is where the individual platform ecosystems they control interact with 
audiovisual media services and other players for which there are industry-wide in-
dependent measures of success. 
Conclusion 
In this article we put forth a theory of harm to citizen wellbeing and used it to de-
fine a specific integrated platform ecosystem creating an operational framework 
for assessing platform power. Our theory of harm from the loss of mass media 
draws on normative understandings of the role of mass media and online plat-
forms in enabling the exercise of individual and collective expression rights. While 
online content sharing platforms are important in many ways, there is a risk of 
harm to citizen wellbeing from a loss of the mass media that invest in audiovisual 
content, much of which is advertising supported. Dominance or problematic con-
centrations of power can result in unfair competition for advertising that threatens 
the long-term viability of other advertising dependent media. A loss of advertising 
supported audiovisual media services could reduce citizens’ access to information 
and representation, and to content that enables the negotiation of shared norms 
and collective identities. Citizens’ expression can be limited if they do not have al-
ternatives to highly personalised media. The specific integrated platform ecosys-
tem we examined was therefore defined so as to include the businesses involved 
in the delivery of audiovisual content to citizens and the trade in the advertising 
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around it. 
The evidence presented here points to disproportionate power or dominance by 
the companies that own multiple platforms at different parts of the ecosystem. 
Firstly, we identified sources of strategic power stemming from structural condi-
tions within this ecosystem. Global companies with vast resources to invest in 
building relationships and faith in what they offer compete with national and local 
companies. There is also a wide-reaching lack of transparency in the trade in on-
line advertising inventory. The evidence we presented above supports calls for 
greater transparency in the trading of online inventory. The model of the French 
Sapin Law is a useful starting point. Secondly, we found three nodes where both 
personal and non-personal data function within this ecosystem and where it ap-
peared infrastructural and strategic power are accumulated. Not all power was in 
the hands of online platforms, however. 
For each of these nodes we outline specific information that would help regulators 
determine if this accumulation results in problematic dominance. At the infrastruc-
tural targeting node, pursuing the information we suggest should inform debates 
about whether some of the infrastructural platforms involved in the advertising 
trade should be regulated as public utilities (Sabeel Rahman, 2018), deemed to 
have “strategic market status” (Furman et al., 2019), or perhaps even be separated 
from owners that also sell inventory (Warren, 2019). At the planning node, a strate-
gic one in which the effectiveness of inventory is determined, the evidence we pre-
sented above suggests that large media agencies feature significantly in the distri-
bution of power. However, more information on the firms involved and how they 
are represented in the data used at this node would be needed to identify any un-
healthy imbalance in that distribution. At the metrics node, we argue that precise 
investigation into the way metrics are defined and the accessibility of that process 
could provide justification for the non-personal data involved to be deemed a pub-
lic resource (Napoli, 2019), or for other means of encouraging or enforcing data 
openness. Information gathering and assessment at these nodes will likely require 
the powers to elicit information held by regulators. 
This investigation looked only at one specific integrated platform ecosystem. The 
largest platform owning companies involved in this ecosystem are also involved in 
others. If the theory of harm used was grounded more in concerns about employ-
ment opportunities and other benefits of a healthy creative sector rather than ex-
pression rights and citizenship, it would likely have involved a different set of non-
platform actors such as independent production companies and rights holders. The 
power of major platform owning companies is likely to be nuanced and vary across 
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integrated platform ecosystem cases. Looking at multiple ones guided by theories 
of harm grounded in understandings of the public interest can contribute to a 
holistic platform policy that avoids knee-jerk reactions. We look forward to seeing 
other specific cases studied. We suspect that both infrastructural and strategic 
power could be found in ecosystems defined by theories of harm to citizens, soci-
eties, and local business from platform engagement with smart cities, or by theo-
ries of harm to businesses and labourers from platforms engaged in e-commerce, 
or by many others derived from citizen wellbeing concerns. 
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